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INTRODUCTION
On April 12, 2001, President George W. Bush approved the
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health In-
formation ("health data privacy regulations")' pursuant to a
congressional mandate in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).2 These regulations, prom-
ulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), represent the first systematic national privacy protec-
tions of health information. They protect the privacy of indi-
vidually identifiable health records in any form (e.g., electronic,
paper, and oral) through access, use, and disclosure limitations,
fair information practices, and privacy and security policies.
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1. See Press Release, President George W. Bush (Apr. 12, 2001), avail-
able at http'J/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04120010412-1.html;
Press Release, Secretary Tommy G. Thompson, Statement by HHS Secretary
Tommy G. Thompson Regarding the Patient Privacy Rule (Apr. 12, 2001),
available at http//www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres /20010412.html.
2. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1997).
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These provisions apply to all "covered entities" (i.e., health pro-
viders, health insurance plans, and health care clearinghouses)
and their "business associates" (e.g., claims processors, billing
managers, data analyzers, and others).3
National privacy safeguards are needed because of the pro-
liferation of and access to health records resulting from the on-
going shift from paper to electronic records within the national
health information infrastructure. The increasing potential to
use or reveal sensitive health data raises concerns about pri-
vacy violations. Health information can include intimate de-
tails about the patient's mental and physical health as well as
social behaviors, personal relationships, and financial status.4
Polling data have consistently shown that Americans are con-
cerned about the privacy of their medical data.5 Over 80% of
respondents in one survey suggested they had "lost all control
over their personal information."6 In another national survey,
78% of respondents felt it is very important that medical re-
cords be kept confidential. 7 Yet, there are multiple justifica-
tions for sharing health data to accomplish various communal
interests. Sharing data may be necessary to achieve important
health purposes (e.g., health research and public health) or for
non-health-related purposes (e.g., the administration of justice
and law enforcement).
We (and others) have previously suggested that health in-
formation privacy laws should carefully balance the need for
individual privacy with the benefits of using health data for the
common good.8 For many, protecting the rights of individuals
to control how their identifiable health data are accessed, used,
or disclosed is the ultimate goal of national health information
privacy standards. Individual interests in privacy, however,
3. See infra Part II.A for specific definitions of "covered entities" and
"business associates."
4. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 451, 489-90 (1995).
5. See Charles A. Welch, Sacred Secrets-The Privacy of Medical Re-
cords, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 371 (2001).
6. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,461 (Dec. 28, 2000) (citing Harris Equifax, Health Information
Privacy (1999)), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/
PvePre0l.htm.
7. THE GALLUP ORG., INST. FOR HEALTH FREEDOM, PUBLIC ATrITuDEs
TOWARD MEDICAL PRIVACY 2 (2000).
8. See, e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr., Lawrence 0. Gostin & Peter D. Jacob-
son, Legal Issues Concerning Electronic Health Information: Privacy, Quality,
and Liability, 282 JAMA 1466, 1470 (1999).
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should not be regarded as absolute. Some disclosures of health
data without specific informed consent are ethically appropri-
ate and legally authorized, such as requirements to report in-
fectious diseases to state health departments9 and the duty to
warn persons at significant risk of harm. 10
The national privacy standards set a "floor" for protections
that, DHHS suggests, "balance[s] the needs of the individual
with the needs of the society."" Reaching this balance, how-
ever, is precarious. In some cases, the common good to be
achieved is not worth the infringement of privacy. In other cir-
cumstances, the need for data may be sufficiently strong to
outweigh the individual's claim to autonomy and privacy. Pri-
vacy laws at the federal, state, and local levels are fragmented
and inconsistent, and do not reflect any coherent formula for
balancing. In particular, the national privacy rule does not al-
ways achieve a fair and reasonable allocation of benefits and
burdens for patients and the community.
We suggest rules for balancing private and public interests
that go beyond the traditional conception of individual auton-
omy as a dominating factor. Rather than seeing autonomy as a
"trump card" that always prevails, our framework values both
privacy and common goods, without a priori favoring either.
We instead seek to maximize privacy interests where they mat-
ter most to the individual and maximize communal interests
where they are likely to achieve the greatest public good. Thus,
where the potential for public benefit is high and the risk of
harm to individuals is low, we suggest that public entities
should have discretion to use data for important public pur-
poses. Individuals should not be permitted to veto the sharing
of personal information irrespective of the potential benefit to
the public. Privacy rules should not be so arduous and inflexi-
9. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Names De-
bate": The Case for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 679 (1998).
10. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil
of Secrecy in HIVIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of
Privacy and Disclosure in Partner Notification, 5 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POLY
9 (1998).
11. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000). Electronic copies of the health data pri-
vacy rule, including background materials and comments published in the
Federal Register, are available at http/vww.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp or
http//www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa. See also Andrew B. Wachler & Phyllis A.
Avery, Complex Privacy Regulations Have Far Reaching Impact, 13 HEALTH
LAW. 1, 3 (2001).
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ble that they significantly impede, for example, health services
research or surveillance necessary to promote the public's
health. Provided that the data are used only for the public
good (e.g., research or public health), and the potential for
harmful disclosures are negligible, there are good reasons for
permitting data sharing.
If the data, however, are disclosed in ways that are
unlikely to achieve a strong public benefit, and the personal
risks are high, individual interests in autonomy should prevail.
For example, if health care professionals disclose personal
health data to family, friends, neighbors, employers, or insur-
ers, the public benefits to be achieved may not be worth the
cost in personal privacy. Such disclosures can cause stigma
and embarrassment. Disclosure to employers or insurers (e.g.,
health, life, or disability) can result in discrimination. These
kinds of unauthorized disclosures can lead to a loss of patient
trust in health care professionals. Individuals may be reluc-
tant to seek medical treatment for some conditions (e.g.,
HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted conditions, or genetic
diseases) or to disclose important information to health profes-
sionals. 12 Consequently, for these kinds of disclosures where
the public benefits are negligible and individual privacy risks
are high, the law should strictly prohibit the release of informa-
tion without the patient's consent.
The framework for balancing we offer attempts to maxi-
mize individual and communal interests in the handling of
identifiable health data. Acquisition, use, or disclosure of
health information that can lead to harm would be subject to
strict privacy protections. Correspondingly, acquisition, use, or
disclosure of health information for important public purposes
would be permitted provided that (1) uses are restricted to the
purposes for which the data are collected, and (2) subsequent
disclosures for other purposes are prohibited without individual
authorization. This framework defends autonomy when indi-
vidual interests are high and public interests are low. We rec-
ognize that adherence to this balancing test will entail a cer-
tain diminution of autonomy. However, it will be worth the
cost in terms of the benefits that everyone will achieve in living
in a society that values the communal goods offered by re-
search, public health, and other public enterprises.
In this Article, we discuss how these principles for balanc-
12. See Gostin, supra note 4, at 490-91.
[Vol.86:14391442
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ing apply in a number of important contexts where individually
identifiable health data are shared. In Part I, we analyze the
modern view favoring autonomy and privacy. In the last sev-
eral decades, individual autonomy has been used as a justifica-
tion for preventing sharing of information irrespective of the
good to be achieved. Although respect for privacy can some-
times be important for achieving public purposes (e.g., fostering
the physician/patient relationship), it can also impair the
achievement of goals that are necessary for any healthy and
prosperous society. A framework for balancing that strictly fa-
vors privacy can lead to reduced efficiencies in clinical care, re-
search, and public health. We reason that society would be bet-
ter served, and individuals would be only marginally less
protected, if privacy rules permitted exchange of data for im-
portant public benefits.
In Part II, we explain the national health information pri-
vacy regulations: (1) what do they cover?; (2) to whom do they
apply?; and (3) how do they safeguard personal privacy? Parts
III and IV focus on whether the standards adhere, or fail to ad-
here, to the privacy principles discussed in Part I. In Part III,
we examine two autonomy rules established in the national
privacy regulations: "informed consent" (for uses or disclosures
of identifiable health data for health-care related purposes) and
"written authorization" (for uses or disclosures of health data
for non-health care related purposes). We observe that the in-
formed consent rule is neither "informed" nor "consensual."
The rule is likely to thwart the effective management of health
organizations without benefiting the individual. Requiring
written authorization, on the other hand, protects individual
privacy to prevent disclosures to entities that do not perform
health-related functions, such as employers and life insurers.
In Part IV, we examine various contexts in which data can
be shared for public purposes under the national privacy rule:
public health, research, law enforcement, familial notification,
and commercial marketing. We apply our framework for bal-
ancing in each context and observe the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the privacy regulations in achieving a fair bal-
ance of private and public interests.
I. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY AND COMMUNAL INTERESTS
A key priority of Congress in enacting HIPAA was to pro-
tect the privacy of identifiable health information. Congress
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
was concerned about the proliferation of health information
and consumer loss of confidence in the health care system.
Fundamental shifts in the organization, delivery, and financing
of health care services were taking place. The integration of
health service functions required the collection, storage, use,
and disclosure of vast amounts of health data. Information was
being shared among those who pay for (e.g., employers and in-
surers), provide (e.g., hospitals and managed care organiza-
tions), and support (e.g., laboratories and pharmacies) health
care services. 13 Health care payers and providers were disclos-
ing data for public (e.g., public health) and commercial (e.g.,
marketing) purposes. To create more efficient methods of stor-
age and dissemination of health data, government and the pri-
vate sector developed more sophisticated information systems,
including electronic databases. 14 The proliferation of health
data and the creation of automated data systems heightened
patient concerns about loss of privacy. For example, in one poll
88% of adults opposed keeping medical records in a national
computerized database. 15 Many people worried about unau-
thorized disclosures of information and breaches of security-
e.g., electronic piracy where hackers gain access to electronic
health databases. 16 The national health data privacy regula-
tions responded to these privacy concerns and focused on the
goal of enhanced personal autonomy.17
The national privacy rules, however, failed to pay sufficient
attention to the many advantages of systematic collection and
use of electronic health data. More accurate and accessible
13. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Personal Privacy in the Health Care System:
Employer-Sponsored Insurance, Managed Care, and Integrated Delivery Sys-
tems, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 361, 364 (1997).
14. See COMM. ON MAINTAINING PRIVACY AND SEC. IN HEALTH CARE
APPLICATIONS OF THE NATL INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L RESEARCH
COuNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION
21-22 (1997).
15. INST. FOR HEALTH FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 3
16. See California HealthCare Foundation, Americans Worry About the
Privacy of Their Computerized Records (Jan. 28, 1999), available at
http//www.chcf.orgpress/view.cfin?itemID=12267.
17. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Informa-
tion, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,461 (Dec. 28, 2000) ("These protections will begin to ad-
dress growing public concerns that advances in electronic technology and evo-
lution in the health care industry are resulting, or may result, in a substantial
erosion of the privacy surrounding individually identifiable health information
maintained by health care providers, health plans and their administrative
contractors."), available at http'/aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre0l.htm.
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data allow patients to make more informed decisions about
health plans, providers, products, and health care charges.
Data improve clinical care by assisting physicians in decision
making (e.g., faster and more accurate diagnoses), 18 providing
increased oversight (e.g., reduction of medical errors 19 and ad-
verse drug events),20 and disseminating expert medical infor-
mation in traditionally under-served communities (e.g., tele-
medicine). Society benefits as well. Efficient data systems
facilitate research on the causes of injury and disease, effective
interventions (e.g., vaccines and pharmaceuticals), and the
quality and cost-effectiveness of health services. Data systems
also improve public health surveillanceal and response to infec-
tious diseases and other threats to the population.22 Electronic
information systems not only improve health care and achieve
public benefits, but also offer better data security. Electronic
tools such as personal access codes, encryption,23 and audit
trails24 can more efficiently prevent and detect unauthorized
access to data systems.25
A. TRADITIONAL BALANCING OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
INTERESTS: THE SALIENCE OF AUTONOMY
The achievement of these, and other, public goods comes
with a cost. Whenever data are shared without the person's
18. See Dereck L. Hunt et al., Effects of Computer-Based Clinical Decision
Support Systems on Physician Performance and Patient Outcomes, 280 JAMA
1339 (1998).
19. See David W. Bates et al., Effect of Computerized Physician Order En-
try and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors, 280
JAMA 1311 (1998); Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Pri-
vacy Regulation on Medical Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J.L. &
MED. 361 (2001).
20. See Robert A. Raschke et al., A Computer Alert System to Prevent In-
jury from Adverse Drug Events, 280 JAMA 1317 (1998).
21. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Public Health Information Infra-
structure: A National Review of the Law on Health Information Privacy, 275
JAMA 1921, 1921 (1996); see also Antoine Flahault et al., FluNet as a Tool for
Global Monitoring of Influenza on the Web, 280 JAMA 1330 (1998) (describing
an Internet application developed by the World Health Organization to moni-
tor the influenza virus globally).
22. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 113-25 (2000).
23. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Breakthrough Possible in Battle Over Encryp-
tion Technology, WASH. POST, July 12, 1998, at A8.
24. See SYS. SEC. STUDY COMM., NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS
AT RisKc SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 88 (1991).
25. See Gostin, supra note 4, at 492-93.
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express agreement there is a loss of autonomy. Whenever in-
timate data are seen by family or friends there may be a feeling
of embarrassment. Whenever data are seen by employers or
insurers there is the potential for discrimination.
There are good reasons for the concern about personal pri-
vacy. Health data contain highly sensitive information such as
diagnoses, treatments, disabilities, and clinical histories. Some
of this information is particularly sensitive, such as HIV/AIDS
or other sexually transmitted infections, mental health, alcohol
or drug use, reproductive status, and genetic diagnoses. Medi-
cal records also contain non-health related personal informa-
tion that can be used to create a broader profile of the individ-
ual's lifestyle and behaviors, including (1) personal identifiers
(e.g., Social Security number, addresses, phone numbers, and
place of employment); (2) demographics (e.g., age, sex, race,
marital status, and children); (3) finances (e.g., employment
and insurance status, income, and methods of payment); (4) in-
formation about why treatment is sought (e.g., the victim of a
violent crime, firearm injury, workplace accident, or the at-
fault party in an auto accident); and (5) confidential expres-
sions of patient concerns about her condition.26
It would be convenient to think that society could achieve
individual interests in privacy and collective interests in re-
search, public health, or other common goods. Indeed, in some
senses privacy protection can promote public goods by facilitat-
ing the doctor/patient relationship and encouraging individuals
to fully utilize health services, cooperate with health agencies,
and avoid falsification of their medical records.27 But more of-
ten than not, strict privacy rules dilute public benefits. Con-
sider a privacy rule that invariably defends personal choice
with respect to disclosures for research or public health. Not
everyone will willingly permit the sharing of personal medical
information for these, or other, public purposes. It might be
argued that it is all right if some people refuse, provided most
agree to share their data. However, the simple acts of asking
and permitting individuals full control over their data can de-
feat the achievement of the public objective. For example, if
people can opt out of health services research, there will be a
26. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Care Information and the Protection
of Personal Privacy: Ethical and Legal Considerations, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 683, 684 (1997).
27. See Hodge, Gostin & Jacobson, supra note 8, at 1470.
1446 [Vol.86:1439
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self-selection bias that seriously compromises the study.28 If in-
dividuals can refuse to allow their data about infectious dis-
eases, gunshot wounds, or other reportable conditions to be
sent to state public health authorities, surveillance would be
seriously undermined.
Given the tradeoffs between privacy and the common good,
it is necessary to have rules for balancing these potentially
competing interests. The extant scholarship tends to offer ei-
ther a rigorous defense of privacy29 or an expansive defense of
public goods.30 Scholars rarely provide a framework for balanc-
ing with reasons for choosing one good over the other. More of-
ten than not, policymakers attempt to reach a balance through
an ad hoc consideration of several factors. How sensitive is the
health data to be protected? What are the interests of the indi-
vidual in maintaining the privacy of the data versus allowing
its disclosure? What are the interests of data holders in pro-
tecting the privacy of the data? Are the data traditionally
shared for communal purposes? Do the entities that use data
for communal purposes typically respect the privacy of the data
for its intended uses?
In the section below, we discuss the most traditional
method of balancing private and collective interests-that is, by
declaring the salience of autonomy. We then offer a new
framework for balancing individual interests in privacy with
societal interests in sharing the data for justifiable public pur-
poses.
1. The Salience of Personal Autonomy
In an American society that strongly values personal
autonomy and decisionmaking,31 protecting individual privacy
is often seen as an overriding objective.32 This is particularly
28. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Jack Hadley, Health Services Research: Public
Benefits, Personal Privacy, and Proprietary Interests, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 833, 834 (1998).
29. See, e.g., JOY PRITrS ET AL., THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY: AN
UNEVEN TERRAIN (1999), available at http//www.georgetown.edu/research/
ihcrp/privacy/statereport.pdf.
30. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIITS OF PRIVACY (1999).
31. See Domestic and International Data Protection Issues: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Gov't Info., Justice, and Agric. of the House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 102d Cong. 1-2 (1991); ALAN WESTIN ET AL., THE EQUIFAX REPORT
ON CONSUMERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1990).
32. See Paul Starr, Health and the Right to Privacy, 25 AM. J.L. & MED.
193, 194 (1999).
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true in the field of health informational privacy.33 Bioethicists,
legal scholars, advocates, and the media have extolled the vir-
tues of health informational privacy.34
Ethical justifications for privacy frequently begin with the
ancient Hippocratic Oath that admonishes physicians to dis-
close personal information.35 If the Hippocratic Oath has any
modern moral force, it would apply principally to physicians
engaged in a therapeutic relationship. The Oath is directed to
the physician and instructs her to keep patient confidences se-
cret. However, most health data are not directly disclosed by
patients or held by treating physicians. Rather, data are gen-
erated from multiple sources such as laboratories, pharmacies,
and research. Data are also used by many entities such as em-
ployers, insurers, and managed care organizations. In a com-
plex modern world, data cannot be maintained tightly within
the bounds of a single physician/patient relationship.
Modern bioethicists defend health informational privacy on
grounds of respect for persons. According to this reasoning,
competent adults have full moral authority to make their own
decisions about their physical and mental well-being. 36 Privacy
enhances individual autonomy by allowing individuals control
over identifiable health information. By exercising control, in-
dividuals can limit disclosures to persons of their choosing.
Controlling their personal information can help individuals
pursue their life goals without outside interference.
Ethicists also use utilitarian arguments to defend privacy.
Medical confidentiality facilitates intimate relationships be-
tween a doctor and her patient, or a health researcher and his
subject. This allows patients to feel comfortable divulging per-
sonal information that is often needed for accurate diagnoses
and treatment. As explained above, unauthorized uses or dis-
closures may subject individuals to embarrassment, social
stigma, and discrimination. 37
33. See Jennifer Kulynych & David Korn, The Effect of the New Federal
Medical-Privacy Rule on Research, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 201 (2002).
34. See, e.g., Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad For Your Health? An
Introduction to the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 481 (2000).
35. See Welch, supra note 5, at 371.
36. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLEs OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 126 (4th ed. 1994).
37. See, e.g., Madison Powers, Privacy and the Control of Genetic Informa-
tion, in THE GENETIC FRONTIER: ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY 77, 80 (Mark S.
Frankel & Albert H. Teich eds., 1994); Gostin & Hodge, supra note 9, at 724.
1448 [Vol.86:1439
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These, and other, philosophical arguments favoring privacy
are valid and important. However, they do not mean that pri-
vacy should be absolute or that autonomy should always pre-
vail. Privacy may need to give way if necessary to promote cer-
tain public goods. Most liberal conceptions of liberty recognize,
for example, that personal autonomy may not be used to cause
significant harm to others.38 Thus, physicians may have a duty
to warn third parties of significant risk of violence39 or infec-
tious disease.40
Policymakers have responded to public concerns about pri-
vacy by enacting laws41 that tend to accentuate the value of
autonomy. Individuals are often granted significant levels of
control over how their health data are accessed, used, and dis-
closed. For example, health information privacy laws, includ-
ing DHHS's privacy regulations, typically feature an "anti-
disclosure rule." That is, disclosures of identifiable health in-
formation are prohibited without the individual's informed con-
sent, subject to some exceptions. This anti-disclosure rule can
thwart legitimate exchanges of health data for communal pur-
poses. Under this simplistic formulation, enhancing individual
autonomy becomes a means for limiting the exchange of infor-
mation irrespective of the good to be achieved. This can lead to
reduced cost-effectiveness in clinical care, research, public
health, and other areas of public need.
2. Communal Uses of Identifiable Health Data
The focus on privacy in scholarship and policymaking fails
to give sufficient weight to data uses for improving health,
safety, and security. Thoughtful uses of health data can reduce
health care costs, facilitate research, advance the public's
health, and achieve many other benefits. Just as individuals
may have an interest in autonomy, so too do they have an in-
terest in living in a healthier, more secure society. Consider
just some of the ways in which data sharing can improve social
well-being.
38. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 36, at 126.
39. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
40. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970).
41. See, e.g., PRITTS ETAL., supra note 29.
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Reducing Costs by Improving Administrative Efficiency
In the United States, health care costs are reimbursed us-
ing a complex array of private (e.g., risk retention plans and
health insurance) and public (e.g., Medicaid and Medicare)
sources of finance. Manual billing for health care, and other
administrative costs, is inefficient and expensive. Computeriz-
ing health data in an electronic health information infrastruc-
ture can reduce these costs by (1) creating databases containing
enrollment, financial, and utilization data, and (2) facilitating
payment and reimbursement transactions between health pro-
viders and insurance plans. DHHS estimates that the use of
electronic health data interchange on a system-wide level will
result in $29.9 billion in savings over the next decade.4 2 Auto-
mation can also reduce fraud and abuse by carefully tracking
providers' reimbursement claims and matching those claims
with electronic treatment records.4 3 To effectuate these sav-
ings, national privacy policies should encourage consumer and
provider participation in electronic filing techniques, and avoid
measures that would limit potential savings (e.g., privacy pro-
tections that allow consumers to "opt out" of computerized
health databases).44
Facilitating Medical and Health Services Research
Medical research on the determinants, prevalence, preven-
tion, and treatment of injury and disease advances clinical and
public health.4 5 Expansive health care databases can facilitate
retrospective studies that rely on existing health data and often
involve rigorous design and statistical methods.46 The sharing
42. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvS., HHS FACT SHEET:
PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF PATIENTS' HEALTH INFORMATION (May 9, 2001),
available at http'//www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/fimal/pvcfact2.htm [hereinaf-
ter HHS FACT SHEET].
43. See COMM. ON REG'L HEALTH DATA NETWORKS, INST. OF MED.,
HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE: USE, DISCLOSURE, AND PRIVACY 76
(Molla S. Donaldson & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1994).
44. Id.
45. See William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative
to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197
(1988).
46. COMM. ON REGL HEALTH DATA NETWORKS, INST. OF MED., supra note
43, at 72-73 (citing C. Fleming et al., A Decision Analysis of Alternative Treat-
ment Strategies for Clinically Localized Prostate Cancer, 269 JAMA 2650
(1993); Grace L. Lu-Yao et al., An Assessment of Radical Prostatectomy: Time
Trends, Geographic Variation, and Outcomes, 269 JAMA 2633 (1993)).
1450 [Vol.86:1439
2002] PERSONAL PRIVACYAND COMMON GOODS 1451
of health data facilitates classic randomized, controlled trials,
particularly large-scale clinical trials that study the safety and
efficacy of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. Health services re-
search includes the investigation of clinical decisions made by
health care professionals, health services or patterns of prac-
tice, behavioral changes of individuals and populations, and the
distribution and determination of health-related states or
events in specified populations. 47 Assessing the quality of
health services requires the free exchange of enormous
amounts of health information, including data related to (1) ac-
cess to care (e.g., waiting times to see primary care practitio-
ners and specialists); (2) appropriateness of care (e.g., numbers
and severity of adverse events based on comparisons among re-
gional practices or guidelines); (3) health outcomes (e.g., per-
centage of low birth weight infants, or mortality rates after a
heart attack or stroke); (4) health promotion (e.g., education
programs such as smoking cessation or stress management
classes); (5) disease prevention (e.g., rates for vaccinations,
mammograms, prenatal care, or HIV screening); and (6) overall
satisfaction with care (e.g., percentage of enrollees satisfied
with the plan or satisfied with their primary care physician,
percentage of enrollees leaving the plan, and the number of
complaints filed).
Modern privacy protections, however, can threaten the ac-
curacy and use of health information for medical research. Pri-
vacy protections that allow consumers to restrict the flow of
their data through informed consent or advance authorization
requirements may hinder the collection of comprehensive and
accurate information that may benefit health consumers. 48
Congress and some states legislatures, for example, have at-
tempted to protect the privacy of genetic information by giving
individuals proprietary interests in their genetic information. 49
Vested with data property rights, individuals can exert signifi-
cant control over how such information is used, including for
the purposes of medical research. Other privacy laws, includ-
ing DHHS's health information privacy regulations, require
47. See John M. Last, Epidemiology and Ethics, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 166, 166-68 (1991).
48. See Douglas Sharrott, Provider-Specific Quality-of-Care Data: A Pro-
posal for Limited Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 85, 89-92 (1992).
49. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET AL., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATuRES, GENETICS POLICY AND LAW: A REPORT FOR POLICYMAKERS
(2001).
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specific informed consent of subjects in many research applica-
tions. The additional expenses of conducting medical research
entailed in informed consent legislation can stymie health re-
search and may offer few benefits for patients. Responding to
public pressure for rigorous privacy protection, Minnesota en-
acted legislation that restricts access to medical records for re-
search purposes. The law requires advance, written informed
consent of patients for health records to be used for medical re-
search. After implementing the law, the Mayo Clinic in Roch-
ester, Minnesota reported that 96% of patients contacted for
the purposes of obtaining informed consent agreed to allow
their medical information to be released to researchers. This
response rate reflects the strong willingness of those receiving
medical care to allow their information to be used for medical
research, but comes at significant expense to medical research-
ers.50 As explained previously, even if most patients can be
tracked and acquiesce to participating in health services re-
search, the data may be scientifically skewed due to self-
selection biases.
Safeguarding the Public Health
Tracking disease and injury in the population and provid-
ing well-targeted prevention services can reduce public health
threats more effectively and at significantly less expense than
personal medical services. 51 Public health agencies at the fed-
eral, state, tribal, and local levels of government have strong
demands for extensive access to identifiable health data.52 This
information is the lifeblood of public health practice. When ag-
gregated, health data can help monitor the incidence, patterns,
and trends of injury and disease in populations. 53 Carefully
planned surveillance or epidemiological studies facilitate rapid
identification of health needs, including (1) the spread of com-
municable or sexually transmitted infection or disease (e.g.,
HIV, TB, hepatitis B virus); (2) clusters or outbreaks of bacte-
50. L. Joseph Melton, HI, The Threat to Medical-Records Research, 337
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1466, 1467 (1997).
51. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000:
NATIONAL HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION OBJECTIVES (1991);
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the
Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 12-14
(1994).
52. See COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF
MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH app. A (1988).
53. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 9, at 710-14.
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rial or viral infection (e.g., Legionnaire's disease, hanta virus,
E. Coli) from naturally occurring sources or bioterrorism; (3)
risk behaviors in sub-populations (e.g., smoking among female
adolescents or ethnic minorities); and (4) harmful conditions
(e.g., child or spousal abuse, lead poisoning, radon, iatrogenic
injuries, or gunshot wounds). Tracking health risks allows
public health authorities to allocate resources and interven-
tions to areas of greatest need.
As with medical and health services research, privacy pro-
tections may limit public health authorities' access to needed
data. Many state laws are so focused on privacy that they hin-
der or prevent basic exchanges of information within the public
and private health sectors. Public health authorities may not
be able to share relevant data with law enforcement or emer-
gency management agencies even in the event of bioterrorism.5 4
Additionally, public health authorities may not be permitted to
monitor health care data in hospitals, managed care organiza-
tions, and pharmacies, even though these data may provide an
early warning of an infectious disease outbreak or bioterror-
ism. 55 In these ways, privacy regulations are used as a shield
to prevent public and private sharing of health data for the
public's health and security.
Existing privacy laws may also prevent public health au-
thorities from sharing data with each other. Registries of data
concerning contagious diseases (e.g., tuberculosis) or other con-
ditions (e.g., cancer) may not be shared among public health
authorities due to specific privacy protections for certain types
of information. Some states do not expressly permit disclosure
of public health information to other states for the control of
communicable diseases.56 As a result, persons with HIV infec-
tion, sexually transmitted diseases, or tuberculosis may be lost
to follow-up when they move from state to state, or different
parts of the same state, due to prohibitions against releasing
identifiable health information.57 State public health authori-
ties may refuse as well to distribute public health information
to federal public health authorities on grounds that the infor-
54. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Conceptualizing the Field After September 11th:
Foreword to a Symposium on Public Health Law, KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
55. See Rene Bowser & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Managed Care and the
Health of a Nation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1217-18 (1999).
56. Gostin et al., supra note 21, at 1925 (e.g., Arkansas, Indiana, and
West Virginia).
57. Id.
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mation is protected against disclosure by privacy laws. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for exam-
ple, has had requests for cancer-related data rebuffed by state
public health authorities who hold such data. CDC needs these
data for national public health research. Some state registries,
however, refuse to supply it, citing privacy-specific laws and
regulations that only allow the release of data to specified enti-
ties, like the National Cancer Institute, or in a non-identifiable
format.
B. MAXIMIZING INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNAL INTERESTS
Balancing individual and collective interests in privacy and
data sharing is complex. Rather than conceiving individual
autonomy as a dominating factor in balancing, we propose a
different approach. Our framework for balancing values indi-
vidual privacy and common goods, without a priori favoring ei-
ther. National health information privacy policies can maxi-
mize privacy interests where they matter most to individuals
and maximize communal interests where they are likely to
achieve the most public good. Our framework focuses on the
nature and extent of the potential harms to individuals and the
goods that can be achieved from data disclosures.
This theoretical structure may be criticized on the grounds
that it is overtly utilitarian and fails to give sufficient weight to
the norm of respect for persons. Seen in the context of modern
liberalism, a framework that does not offer individuals full con-
trol over uses of personal data is vulnerable to a harsh critique.
Modern liberalism frequently sees individuals as isolated be-
ings devoid of social context. But people live in networks of
families, neighborhoods, towns, and cities. The norm of respect
for persons assumes that maximizing each individual's freedom
will benefit society as well. Giving each person a veto over par-
ticipation in activities that provide manifest social advantages
is not beneficial to the wider community. It means that a few
individuals can hinder activities that enhance well-being for
the population. Individuals may desire privacy, but they
should also want to live in communities that promote health,
safeguard security, and facilitate medical research.
Finding a balance between individual choice and public
goods requires an assessment of consequences and, therefore, is
frankly utilitarian. Some questions cannot be avoided: How
much do individuals lose by giving up some control over per-
sonal information? How much does society gain by the freer
1454 [Vol.86:1439
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use of health information? It is important to see that trade-offs
between private and public interests are necessary. Only in
this way is it possible to give individuals a certain level of pri-
vacy without jeopardizing all the good that can come from in-
formation collection and dissemination.
Uses or Disclosures for the Common Good.
Where the potential for public benefit is high and the risk
of harm to individuals is low, public entities should have dis-
cretion to use data for important public purposes (e.g., cost-
effective health care, public health, and research). In such
cases, public entities should be able to acquire and use the data
regardless of individual informed consent or other privacy pro-
tections. Nor should privacy standards or procedures be so in-
flexible (e.g., property rights in health data) or expensive (e.g.,
specific informed consent for use of health data in medical re-
search) that they significantly impede the achievement of
common goods.
Consider a rule that provides flexibility in the use of health
data for legitimate health care, public health, or research pur-
poses. We are making the assumption that data users are
likely to achieve an important public purpose and will not dis-
close information outside the health care, public health, or re-
search enterprise in which they are engaged. In such circum-
stances individuals are unlikely to experience intangible harm
such as embarrassment or more tangible damage such as dis-
crimination. Health care providers, public health officials, or
researchers usually do not seek or use information in ways that
are detrimental to the individual. Data disclosures outside the
public enterprise (e.g., to the patient or subject's family,
friends, or employer) would be subject to strict privacy rules.
Although use of health data for important public purposes
would be permitted under our standards, data users would still
be required to demonstrate the public need and limit the poten-
tial for individual harm. The following principles would apply
to all data users: (1) demonstrate the need for data to achieve
an important public purpose; (2) demonstrate that the data
sought are the least extensive necessary to achieve the public
purposes; (3) de-identify the data whenever possible and practi-
cable, consistent with the achievement of the public good; (4)
implement privacy and security standards to ensure that per-
sons may access data only where necessary for the performance
of essential functions; and (5) implement fair information prac-
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tices such as permitting individuals access to their health in-
formation and the purposes for which it is being used. Provided
these measures are observed, a regular and free exchange of
data should occur.
Uses or Disclosures Likely to Result in Harm
Where identifiable health data are used or disclosed in
ways that are not likely to achieve an important public benefit,
and the risks to individuals are high, privacy safeguards should
be robust. In such cases, standards and procedures for safe-
guarding privacy, such as informed consent and anti-disclosure
prohibitions, are appropriate. For example, if a health care or
public health professional discloses intimate personal informa-
tion to friends, neighbors, employers, or insurers, the potential
harm of embarrassment, stigma, or discrimination is high, but
public benefits are low. Imposing a rule that data cannot be
used outside the health care, public health, or research system
does not significantly jeopardize the achievement of public
goods, and reassures patients that disclosures likely to cause
them harm will not occur.
This framework for balancing will not prevent some pa-
tients from feeling wronged when personal information is used
in ways of which they do not approve. Even if they are not
harmed in discrete ways, patients may feel aggrieved by the
failure to respect their choices. This feeling of personal enti-
tlement is fostered by a culture that celebrates individual
autonomy and de-emphasizes collective well-being. A cultural
expectation, supported by a legal rule, that asks each individ-
ual to give up a small amount of autonomy in exchange for sub-
stantial benefits for the community may change patient expec-
tations and result in a healthier society. Our framework is
based on a common sense understanding that individual inter-
ests should yield if personal burdens are small and potential
public benefits are substantial.
II. THE NATIONAL HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY
STANDARD
To be effective, a comprehensive, national health informa-
tion privacy policy should balance individual interests in pro-
tecting the privacy of health data with societal needs to share
the data for communal purposes. 58 Reaching this balance on a
58. See Donna E. Shalala, Health Care Information and Privacy, 8
1456 [Vol.86:1439
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national scale has proven to be precarious. In this and the sub-
sequent Part, we briefly describe the process through which na-
tional health information privacy regulations came about, the
scope of these regulations, and particularly how these regula-
tions fit with our framework for balancing.
A. THE SCOPE OF THE STANDARD
Health information privacy regulations promulgated by
DHHS pursuant to congressional authority under HIPAA are
the product of years of legislative and administrative efforts.
Through HIPAA, Congress originally imposed a deadline of
August 21, 1999 to pass health information privacy legisla-
tion.59 As a result of interest group lobbying,60 a diverse health
law and policy agenda, and party politics in the House and
Senate, Congress failed to pass a comprehensive privacy law by
the deadline.61 HIPAA authorized the Secretary of DHHS to
issue privacy regulations in the event that Congress failed to
act within its self-imposed deadline. 62 The initial publication of
DHHS's proposed regulations in November 199963 garnered
over 52,000 public comments6" and delayed the production of
the final regulations until December 2000.65 After President
Bush took office, privacy advocates were concerned that his
administration might scale back or eliminate the regulations
altogether.66 On April 14, 2001, however, the regulations were
finalized subject to interpretive guidelines,67 the first of which
HEALTH MATRIX 223, 230-31 (1998).
59. HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (1997).
60. See Amy Goldstein & Robert O'Harrow, Bush Will Proceed on Patient
Privacy, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2001, at Al.
61. Id.; see HHS FACT SHEET, supra note 42.
62. HIPAA § 264(c)(1).
63. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
64 Fed. Reg. 59,918-60,065 (Nov. 3, 1999).
64. Peter A. Setness, HIPAA and the Changing Face of Patient Privacy:
New Legislation Requires Timely Response, 111 POSTGRADUATE MED. (2002),
available at http://www.postgradmed.com/issues/200210102/editorialjan.htm.
65. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462-829 (Dec. 28, 2000).
66. See HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, COMIENTS ON THE FINAL FEDERAL
STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH
INFORMATION 2-3 (2001); Terry, supra note 19, at 361; Goldstein & O'Harrow,
supra note 60; see also Robert Pear, White House Plans to Revise New Medical
Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 22 (announcing the Bush admini-
stration's position to revise the rules).
67. See Goldstein & O'Harrow, supra note 60; Pear, supra note 66.
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were released by DHHS in July 2001.68 The regulations take
effect for most covered entities on April 14, 2003, and a year
later for small health plans.
Though their development was convoluted, the health data
privacy regulations provide privacy protections for health care
consumers 69 within the scope of DHHS's limited authority un-
der HIPAA.70 In this section, we address two questions con-
cerning the national health information privacy regulations: (1)
What information is protected? and (2) to whom do the protec-
tions apply?
1. What Information is Protected?
The regulations explicitly cover individually identifiable
health information 71 (i.e., protected health information (PHI)).7 2
PHI includes any data that contains uniquely identifiable char-
acteristics, including a name, social security or drivers' license
68. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH
INFORMATION, available at http'//www.aspe.bhs.gov/admnsimp/final/
pvcguidel.htm (last revised July 6, 2001) [hereinafter DHHS STANDARDS];
Ceci Connolly, Guidelines on Patient Privacy Rules Issued, WASH. POST, July
7, 2001, at A6; Robert Pear, Administration Clarifies New U.S. Rules Guard-
ing Privacy of Patients, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2001, at A9.
69. To enforce these protections, DHHS's Secretary can investigate com-
plaints and conduct compliance reviews. Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.306, .308 (2001). Violations
of the standard can lead to civil and criminal penalties up to $250,000 and ten
years in prison. HHS FACT SHEET, supra note 42. There is no private right of
action for individuals to redress violations.
70. Cf A. Craig Eddy, A Critical Analysis of Health and Human Services'
Proposed Health Privacy Regulations in Light of The Health Insurance Privacy
(sic) and Accountability Act of 1996, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 50-60 (2000) (dis-
cussing the constitutional issues involved in Congress's delegation of authority
to DHHS under HIPAA).
71. Health information is comprehensively defined as data (1) "created or
received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, em-
ployer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse;" and (2)
.relate[d] to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition
of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, pre-
sent, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual." 45
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001) (defining "health information").
72. Id. § 164.514. DHHS defines individually identifiable health informa-
tion as health information that "identifies [an] individual" or "[w]ith respect to
which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to
identify the individual." Id. § 164.501 (defining "individually identifiable
health information"). The regulatory definition limits the term to only a sub-
set of health information, specifically that created or received by health care
providers, health plans, employers, or health care clearinghouses. Id.
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number, address, fingerprint, or genetic link.73 Where health
data are truly non-identifiable, privacy interests are minimal.74
Consequently, the national privacy rules do not restrict access,
use, or disclosure of non-identifiable data. Non-identifiable
data (e.g., aggregate statistical data, non-linked data, or other
data stripped of all individual identifiers) thus require no indi-
vidual privacy protections, 75 and are not covered by the regula-
tions. This provides an incentive for data holders to use or de-
identify health information to diminish the risk of harmful dis-
closures and uses of personal data.76 DHHS permits covered
entities to de-identify by assigning codes that can later allow
for re-identification. 77
PHI includes all mediums (electronic, oral, and paper) of
health information.78 Protecting the privacy of all mediums of
health information recognizes the impracticability of separat-
ing paper-based records from electronic or oral-based data.
Failing to protect all mediums of health data would leave a sig-
73. The health data privacy rule outlines two means for determining if
health information is not individually identifiable, or "de-identified," and thus
no longer regulated by the rule. First, an expert utilizing accepted analytic
techniques can conclude that "the risk is very small that the information could
be used, alone or in combination with other reasonably available information"
to identify the subject of the information. Id. § 164.514(b)(1)(i). A second
permitted means of de-identification is that the covered entity can remove a
comprehensive set of identifiers of the individual and of relatives, employers,
and household members of the individual. These identifiers include names,
geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, dates more specific than years,
contact information such as telephone and fax numbers and e-mail addresses,
identification numbers such as social security numbers, account and medical
record numbers, license place numbers, etc.; and full face photographic im-
ages. Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i).
74. Contra Yaron F. Dunkel, Medical Privacy Rights in Anonymous Data:
Discussion of Rights in the United Kingdom and the United States in Light of
the Source Informatics Cases, 23 Loy. LA. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 41 (2001).
75. Non-identifiable health data may raise privacy concerns at a group
level, although DHHS's regulations do not attempt to address or protect
"group privacy" interests. For a definition of "group privacy" in the context of
genetic data, see James G. Hodge, Jr. & Mark E. Harris, International Genet-
ics Research and Issues of Group Privacy, J. BIOLAW & Bus., Special Supp. 15
(2001).
76. See HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, BEST PRINCIPLES FOR HEALTH
PRIVACY 15-16 (1999).
77. The code must not be derived from or related to information about the
individual or able to be translated so that the individual can be identified. 45
C.F.R. § 164.514(c)(1) (2001). The covered entity must also not disclose or use
the code for other purposes than record identification and cannot disclose the
mechanism for re-identification. Id. § 164.514(c)(2).
78. Id. § 164.501 (defining "protected health information").
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nificant amount of health communications unregulated by fed-
eral law and complicate enforcement.7 9 Through HIPAA, how-
ever, Congress may have limited DHHS's authority to regulate
non-electronic communication. 80 Although DHHS maintains it
has "ample legal authority,"81 its regulations are structured so
that provisions concerning non-electronic communications are
severable by court action from electronic communications. 82
2. Who is Covered?
Congress has limited DHHS's authority to promulgate
health information privacy regulations to a defined set of per-
sons. 83 The regulations apply to covered entities (health care
plans, health providers, and health care clearinghouses 84) and
79. See PRITr ET AL., supra note 29, at 6-7.
80. Section 264 of HIPAA, which contains the congressional mandate to
DHHS to develop the privacy standard, evolved because of the administrative
simplification goals of the statute related to electronic information exchange.
See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,469 (Dec. 28, 2000); see also Eddy, supra note 70, at 18. The
statute describes the scope of DHHS's authority in terms of regulation of indi-
vidual rights over individually identifiable health information, not electronic
transactions or administrative simplification. The statute states that if Con-
gress fails to meet the deadline, DHHS must "at least" develop regulations
that address "(1) The rights that an individual who is a subject of individually
identifiable health information should have (2) The procedures that should be
established for the exercise of such rights [and] (3) The uses and disclosures of
such information that should be authorized or required." HIPAA, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 264(b), 110 Stat. 1936 (1997) (giving the requirements for DHHS's
recommendation to Congress when Congress is considering legislation before
its self-imposed deadline has passed). In a cross-reference to section 264(b),
section 264(c) applies these requirements to the regulations that are man-
dated if Congress doesn't meet its deadline. Id. § 264(c), 110 Stat. at 2033.
The use of "at least" and the lack of a reference to the administrative simplifi-
cation sections or electronic transactions in these detailed requirements sug-
gests that Congress did not intend to limit DHHS to protecting privacy in elec-
tronic transactions only. PRITTS ET AL., supra note 29, at 5.
81. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,496 (Dec. 28, 2000).
82. Id. In a successful court challenge to the broad coverage, the judge
could order that the phrase "regarding non-electronic information" be struck
from the regulation while the standard would remain intact for electronic
communications.
83. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2001).
84. A health care clearinghouse is
a public or private entity, including a billing service, repricing com-
pany, community health management information system or commu-
nity health information system.., that ... (1) Processes or facilitates
the processing of health information received from another entity in a
nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data content into
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their business associates. Health plans, which provide or pay
for the cost of medical care, are covered whether they are pri-
vate entities (e.g., health insurers or managed care organiza-
tions) or government organizations (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare, or
the Veterans Administration).8 5 Health care providers (e.g.,
physicians, hospitals, and clinics) are covered if they "trans-
mit] any health information in electronic form in connection
with a transaction covered by [the regulations]. "86 Electronic
exchanges can include billing and fund transfers in addition to
communications containing health information.
The regulation also applies to the business associates8 7
(e.g., lawyers, accountants, billing companies, and other con-
tractors) whose relationships with covered entities require the
sharing of PHI.88 DHHS requires covered entities to assure
that their business associates comply with privacy standards. 89
If a covered entity knows of a privacy violation by a business
associate and does not address it, the entity may be considered
to be violating the rules.90 Through this oversight function,
DHHS regulates some of the downstream users and processors
of PHI.91
standard data elements or a standard transaction [or] (2) Receives a
standard transaction from another entity and processes or facilitates
the processing of health information into nonstandard format or non-
standard data content for the receiving entity.
Id. § 160.103.
85. Id. (defining "health plan").
86. Id. § 160.102(a)(3).
87. A business associate with respect to a covered entity is
a person who... assists in the performance of... [a] function or ac-
tivity involving the use or disclosure of individually identifiable
health information, including claims processing or administration,
data analysis, processing or administration, utilization review, qual-
ity assurance, billing, benefit management, practice management,
and repricing; or... [pirovides, other than in the capacity of a mem-
ber of the workforce of such covered entity, legal, actuarial, account-
ing, consulting, data aggregation (as defined in section 164.501 of this
subchapter), management, administrative, accreditation, or financial
services to or for such covered entity, or to or for an organized health
care arrangement in which the covered entity participates, where the
provision of the service involves the disclosure of individually identi-
fiable health information from such covered entity or arrangement, or
from another business associate of such covered entity or arrange-
ment, to the person.
Id. § 160.103.
88. Id. § 160.102(a)(3).
89. Id. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).
90. Id. § 164.502(e)(1)(iii).
91. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, National Health Information Privacy: Regu-
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Though the regulations are comprehensive in their cover-
age, not all persons or entities who regularly use, disclose, or
store identifiable health data are covered. The regulations do
not cover groups such as auto, life, and worker compensation
insurers, even though these entities regularly use personal
medical information.92 Additional protections governing all
identifiable health data, regardless of its holder or manner of
communication, would broaden national protections of health
information privacy.
B. FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES
Persons and entities maintaining PHI must comply with a
range of fair information practices that allows individuals to
make informed choices about the delivery and financing of their
health care. The health information privacy regulations vest
health consumers with several fair information practices, in-
cluding rights to access protected health information, amend
protected health information, receive notice, and request an ac-
counting of disclosures.
1. Access to Protected Health Information
Individuals are granted a range of access rights to their
PHI. 93 These include on-site inspections of records and the
provision of copies.94 Covered entities must act within thirty
days upon a request for access to health data by a person who
is the subject of the data.95 In most instances, covered entities
must accommodate a request for access, or provide a fair and
informed process in case of denials.9 6 The regulations permit
lations Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 285
JAMA 3015, 3016 (2001).
92. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Intersection of Federal Health Informa-
tion Privacy and State Administrative Law: The Protection of Individual
Health Data and Workers' Compensation, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 117, 118 (1999).
93. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2001). The covered entity may require that the
request be in writing. Id. § 164.524(b)(1).
94. Id. § 164.524(c)(1).
95. Id. § 164.524(b)(2)(i). Sixty days is allowed if the information is held
off-site. Id. § 164.524(b)(2)(ii). Delay is also allowed if the covered entity in-
forms the individual in writing of the reasons it requires more time and when
the request will be granted. Id. § 164.524(b)(2)(iii).
96. The denial must be in writing and in plain language. It must explain
the reasons for the denial, any rights for review over the decision, and meth-
ods of complaint to the covered entity. Id. § 164.524(d)(2). Access should be
granted to any information that does not meet the specific grounds for denial.
Id. § 164.524(d)(1). If a review of the denial is warranted, it is conducted by a
1462 [Vol.86:1439
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narrow, unreviewable reasons for denials regarding requests
for psychotherapy notes; information likely to be used in a civil,
criminal, or administrative proceeding; and requests by in-
mates to their correctional facility or health care provider that
might threaten the health or safety of the individual or oth-
ers.9 7 In limited other circumstances, 98 a covered entity may
deny access although an individual may request a review of the
grounds for denial.9 9 Covered entities may also provide a
summary of an individual's PHI instead of the actual docu-
ments (if the individual agrees).l°0
2. Amend Protected Health Information
Individuals can amend inaccuracies or missing information
in their PHI.1 01 The covered entity must act within sixty days
on a request to amend.102 If the covered entity agrees to the
amendment, it must (1) identify the records that are affected;
(2) append or provide a link to the amendment; 0 3 (3) inform the
individual that the amendment has been made;1°4 and (4) work
with other covered entities or business associates who possess
or receive the data to make the amendments as well. 10 5 As
licensed health care professional who is designated by the covered entity but is
not directly involved in the decision to deny access. Id. § 164.524(d)(4).
97. Id. § 164.524(a)(1), (2). Information obtained from another based on a
promise of confidentiality that would likely reveal the identity of the source
may be denied without review. Id. § 164.524(a)(2)(v). Also, health care pro-
viders may temporarily deny access during research based on an individual's
care if the individual has consented to both the research and the denial of ac-
cess during research. Id. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii).
98. Id. § 164.524(a). These situations include where a licensed health
care professional determines that access will endanger the life or physical
safety of the individual or another person. Id. § 164.524(a)(3)(i).
99. Id. § 164.524(a)(4). This provision specifically covers determinations
that references to another person will endanger that other individual. Id. §
164.524(a)(3)(ii). It also covers situations in which the access is "reasonably
likely to cause substantial harm to the individual or another person." Id. §
164.524(a)(3)(iii).
100. Id. § 164.524(c)(2)(ii).
101. Id. § 164.526.
102. Id. § 164.526(b)(2)(i). An extension of thirty days is possible if the
covered entity explains the reasons for delay and the date on which it will re-
spond to the request in writing to the individual. Id. § 164.526(b)(2)(ii).
103. Id. § 164.526(c)(1).
104. Id. § 164.526(c)(2), (3). It must also notify persons or entities (1) iden-
tified by the individual as needing the amended information; or (2) known by
the covered entity to have PHI about the individual and who may rely on the
information to the detriment of the individual. Id.
105. Id. § 164.526(e).
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with access rights, covered entities may deny amendments in
certain circumstances, particularly if they determine that the
record is "accurate and complete,"' °6 with written notice to the
individual. 0 7 Unlike disputes over denial to access, there is no
final review to clarify which party, the individual or the covered
entity, is correct. A covered entity may merely respond to indi-
vidual disagreements with a written rebuttal.108
3. Receive Notice
HIPAA provides that "[ilndividuals ha[ve] the right to ade-
quate notice of the uses and disclosures of [PHI] that may be
made by the covered entity," 9 and to know the covered entity's
privacy and security policies and fair information practices re-
quirements. 110 Notices must be in plain language to avoid con-
fusion. 111 The timing of the notice required depends on the type
of covered entity.112 Additional consumer safeguards apply to
106. Id. § 164.526(a)(2)(iv). Other grounds for denial are (1) if the covered
entity did not create the information or record, it may deny the request unless
the individual reasonably shows that the originator of the information is no
longer available to address the amendment request and (2) if the individual
could not access the record because of restrictions laid out in section above, the
covered entity would have grounds to deny the amendment. Id. §
164.526(a)(2)(i), (iii).
107. Id. § 164.526(d)(1). It must be in plain language and explain the rea-
sons for the denial, any rights for review of the decision, and methods of com-
plaint to the covered entity. Id.
108. Id. § 164.526(d)(3). The individual must be provided with a copy of
the rebuttal. The written statement and rebuttal must then be appended or
linked to the appropriate records by the covered entity, id. § 164.526(d)(4), and
included, when relevant, in any future disclosures. Id. § 164.526(d)(5)(i). "If
the individual has not submitted a written statement of disagreement," then
the request for amendment and the covered entity's denial must be included if
the individual has requested such disclosure. Id. § 164.526(d)(5)(ii).
109. Id. § 164.520(a)(1).
110. Id. § 164.520(a)(1). The notice must include information about how
individuals may complain about potential misuses or violations to the covered
entity and the Secretary of DHHS or contact the covered entity with questions.
Id. § 164.520(b)(1)(vi).
111. Id. § 164.520(b)(1).
112. Id. § 164.520(c)(1), (2). Health plans must provide notice to covered
individuals by the compliance date of the regulation. Id. § 164.520(c)(1)(A).
New enrollees must get the notice at time of enrollment. Id. §
164.520(c)(1)(B). At least once every three years, the health plan must notify
enrollees in the plan that the notice is available and the methods by which
they can obtain it. Id. § 164.520(c)(1)(C)(ii). In contrast, health care provid-
ers have to provide the notice upon the first service delivery after the compli-
ance date. Id. § 164.520(c)(2).
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covered entities that provide notice electronically. 13
4. Request an Accounting of Disclosures
Covered entities are required to maintain an accounting of
disclosures of PHI (other than for disclosures related to treat-
ment, payment, and health care operations, or other excep-
tions).114 The accounting includes the name (and address if
known) of the person or entity who received the information,
the date of the disclosure, a brief description of the information
disclosed, and a brief explanation of the reasons for disclosure
if not authorized by the patient.115 Patients have a limited
right to receive the accounting of disclosures over the six year
period prior to the request. 16
C. THE EFFECTS OF PREEMPTION
Pursuant to Congressional mandate through HIPAA,
DHHS cannot preempt state health information privacy laws
that are more protective of health information privacy rights
than the national privacy regulations.11 7 Some states may offer
more protections through, for example, "super-confidentiality"
laws for genetic, mental health, or HIV/AIDS information.
Thus, because existing federal or state laws that provide more
privacy protections remain, DHHS's privacy regulations create
a federal "floor" of protections.
This multi-level approach allows states to tailor health in-
formation privacy policies to the specific needs of their popula-
113. Id. § 164.520(c)(3). An individual must agree to obtain the notice via
e-mail. A paper copy must be provided "if the covered entity knows that the e-
mail transmission has failed." Id. § 164.520(c)(3)(ii). Health care providers
must give electronic notice automatically and simultaneously when their first
service delivery is electronic. Id. § 164.520(c)(3)(iii). If a covered entity main-
tains a website that offers information about its benefits and services, it must
also prominently post its notice on the website as well as make it available
electronically. Id. § 164.520(c)(3)(i).
114. Id. § 164.528(a)(1). These include disclosures for national security
and intelligence purposes; correctional institutions; and health oversight
agencies or law enforcement officials who document that the agency's officials
would be impeded if the accounting revealed the disclosure. Id. §
164.528(a)(1), (2).
115. Id. § 164.528(b)(2).
116. Id. § 164.528(a)(1).
117. Id. § 160.203(b) (2001). State laws are also not preempted if they pro-
mote certain goods such as public health, efficacy in payment of health care,
fraud prevention, and audits and program monitoring. Id. § 160.203(a), (c),
(d).
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tions, but there are at least two disadvantages (1) Individuals
in some states may unfairly benefit from greater privacy pro-
tections than in other states; and (2) where most electronic
health data are exchanged across state boundaries, covered en-
tities (specifically larger health care providers, plans, and clear-
inghouses) must adhere to national and regional privacy stan-
dards. This results in higher costs than would occur if a
uniform national standard were in place.
III. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY AND SHARING HEALTH DATA
The national privacy regulations restrict the use and dis-
closure of health data under specified circumstances. Some
level of individual control over the use and disclosure of PHI is
essential to ensure privacy because of the potential risks of
harm from unlimited sharing of personal medical data. The
principal question, however, is how much control individuals
should exercise. The regulations differentiate among the vari-
ous purposes for which data may be used and disclosed. Uses
and disclosures for health care-related purposes (e.g., provision
or payment for health care services) are liberally permitted, al-
beit with the advance "informed consent" of each patient. Uses
and disclosures of PHI for other purposes outside the health
care context are limited. Disclosures may be made pursuant to
written authorization by the individual who is the subject of
the data, subject to some exceptions. In either context, a mini-
mum disclosure rule applies: When using or disclosing PHI, "a
covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit [PHI] to
the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose."' 18
The minimum disclosure rule helps patients maintain privacy,
for example in reimbursement transactions, where only specific
health information is needed.11 9
In this Part, we examine DHHS's use and disclosure rules
for health care and non-health care purposes and compare
118. Id. §164.502(b)(1).
119. DHHS's recent guidance has clarified a significant concern of health
care providers over the permitted uses during treatment when consulting with
other physicians or medical staff. The standard as written specifies that the
minimum disclosure requirement applies for use of PHI during treatment by
health care providers, but not disclosures. This has caused confusion about
how health care providers can utilize vital health information in the course of
treatment as they work with other medical professionals. In the July 2001
guidance, DHHS explained that the exemption for disclosures during treat-
ment allows health care providers to share information with other providers.
See DHHS STANDARDS, supra note 68.
1466 [Vol.86:1439
2002] PERSONAL PRrVACYAND COMMON GOODS 1467
these rules with the balancing framework we have proposed.
A. INDIVIDUAL CONSENT FOR USES AND DISCLOSURES OF
PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION FOR HEALTH CARE PURPOSES
DHHS's regulations presently require covered health care
providers to obtain written consent from individuals before us-
ing or disclosing information for treatment, payment, or health
care operations. Such consent must (1) be in plain language; 120
(2) "[ilnform the individual that [PHI] may be used and dis-
closed to carry out" those activities;121 (3) indicate that the in-
dividual can revoke the consent in writing;122 and may (4) re-
quest that the covered entity restrict how PHI is used or
disclosed for health care purposes (though the covered entity is
not required to agree).123
Requiring prior informed consent for use and disclosure of
health data for transaction purposes is consistent with the pre-
vailing practice in many health care settings in the United
States. Most health consumers, often unwittingly, sign a series
of waivers upon seeking medical care that allow disclosures
among providers, insurers, data handlers, and collection agen-
cies. In a prior version of the health information privacy regu-
lations, DHHS attempted to eliminate the formal informed con-
sent requirement. This was strongly opposed by privacy
advocates on the basis that it allowed multiple exchanges of
health data without any patient consent. Recently the Bush
Administration proposed dropping the informed consent re-
quirement, although no final rule has been made.
124
The written informed consent requirement for use and dis-
closure of PHI for health care purposes is poorly designed and
ineffective. Consent, in fact, is neither informed nor consen-
sual. A patient is required to sign a consent form on his first
visit to a physician; that form provides consent for all future
120. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c) (2001).
121. Id. § 164.506(c)(1), (2). The consent may not be combined in a single
document with the notice. Id. § 164.506(b)(3).
122. Id. § 164.506(c)(5).
123. Id. § 164.506(c)(4). If the covered entity does agree, the agreement is
binding. Id. § 164.522(a) (restating the standard for an individual's right to
request restrictions of uses and disclosures and documenting the requirements
for termination of the restrictions).
124. Robert Pear, Bush Acts to Drop Core Privacy Rule on Medical Data,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, available at http'//www.nytimes.com/200203/22/
politics/22PRIV.html.
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disclosures and uses. At the time the form is signed, the indi-
vidual is not even aware of the substance of the data protected.
The patient may not know what is currently contained in his
health records and he certainly will not know what information
will be added in the future.125 At the time of consent, he will
also not be aware of the specific uses or disclosures of his
health data because the form he executes may generally au-
thorize disclosures for "treatment, payment, or health care op-
erations." For these reasons, the person's execution of a writ-
ten consent prior to treatment is uninformed. The consent also
is not completely voluntary. The regulations explicitly permit
providers to condition enrollment in a plan or medical treat-
ment (in non-emergency cases) on whether the individual signs
the consent document. 126 In effect, the patient is forced to con-
sent if he wants to obtain treatment or health insurance. 127
The only practical result of an informed consent requirement is
to alert the patient to the general ways in which his health
data will be used and disclosed. Absent the ability to further
control these uses and disclosures, this merely constitutes no-
tice of data sharing practices.
Society benefits from a more cost-efficient health care sys-
tem through faster and less expensive transactions and poten-
tial improvements in clinical care. Imposing a national in-
formed consent requirement is burdensome on the health care
system. While many health providers already require individ-
ual informed consent as part of many health care transactions,
all covered entities will have to develop mechanisms to obtain,
access, and store consent forms from every individual. Health
care providers may also have to delay treatment to the detri-
ment of patients if consent forms are lost or unsigned. 128
We have argued that where the benefit to the individual is
small and the burden on public services is large, privacy rules
should yield. In this case, "informed consent" provides very lit-
tle benefit to the individual because she has little choice but to
acquiesce to the data use. At the same time, the burdens on
the health care system are substantial because informed con-
sent entails significant administrative costs in obtaining and
storing consent documents. In such circumstances, the regula-
tions neither protect privacy nor facilitate quality health care.
125. See Gostin, supra note 91, at 3017.
126. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b)(1), (2) (2001).
127. See PRITs ET AL., supra note 29, at 16.
128. See id.
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We would, therefore, eliminate the informed consent rule and
replace it with an enhanced notification requirement. The elec-
tronic, free-flowing exchange of data among health care profes-
sionals, institutions, and insurers for the purposes of process-
ing a health claim or delivering medical service implicates few
individual privacy concerns, but promotes efficiency in data
processing.
B. INDIVIDuAL AUTHORIZATION FOR NON-HEALTH RELATED
PURPOSES
The regulations employ a different consent model for dis-
closures and uses of PHI unrelated to health care (e.g., for em-
ployment decisions or evaluation of credit status). The regula-
tions incorporate an "anti-disclosure rule." Prior to use or
disclosure of PHI for non-health care purposes, covered entities
must obtain an authorization from the individual. Unlike the
informed consent requirement for health care-related disclo-
sures, an individual's choice is respected. The exercise of the
right of refusal cannot be used to deny the patient treatment or
health insurance. 129
Also unlike the informed consent requirement, the authori-
zation contains specific information to help individuals decide
whether to permit disclosure or use. Such authorizations must
(1) identify the information to be used or disclosed in a "specific
and meaningful fashion";130 (2) provide the names of the per-
sons or organizations who will make and receive the use or dis-
closures;13' (3) explain the purpose for each request; (4) notify
the individual of his right to refuse to sign the authorization
without negative consequences to treatment or health plan eli-
gibility (except under specific circumstances); 132 (5) be written
in plain language; 133 (6) include an expiration date; 134 and (7)
129. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(4) (2001). There are some limited exceptions.
First, health care providers may condition provision of research-related treat-
ment on authorization. Id. § 164.508(b)(4)(i). Second, if the covered entity is
gathering individually identifiable health information solely for the purposes
of disclosing it to a third party, such as an employer, the covered entity may
condition this care on the authorization to disclose it to the third party. Id. §
164.508(b)(4)(iv). Further protection is offered regarding psychotherapy notes;
authorization is always required for use and disclosure of psychotherapy notes
except in specified health care operations. Id. § 164.508(b)(4)(ii)(B).
130. Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(i).
131. Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(ii), (iii).
132. Id. § 164.508(e)(1).
133. Id. § 164.508(c)(2).
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explain that the individual has a right to revoke the authoriza-
tion 135 at any time in writing except where the covered entity
has already relied on the authorization. 136
Advance written authorization for uses or disclosures of
health data for non-health care purposes is an important pri-
vacy safeguard. Outside disclosures are unlike those that occur
in the health care setting where information is needed to com-
plete a health-related transaction and the risks of harm to in-
dividuals are negligible. Disclosures to public or private sector
entities or persons outside the health care context can lead to
significant harms. Disclosures to existing or potential employ-
ers, insurers (other than an existing health insurance company
that presently needs to process a claim), governmental agen-
cies, commercial marketers, family members, friends,
neighbors, or others can negatively affect an individual's job
status or opportunities, insurability, and social status. People
are rightfully concerned about these types of disclosures. Un-
der our balancing approach, individuals should have some right
to control disclosures that can result in discrimination, stigma-
tization, or embarrassment. At the same time, outside disclo-
sures are unlikely to achieve an important health-related objec-
tive. Providing patients with the right to control such uses of
data will not undermine an important public interest.
IV. MAKING EXCEPTIONS: BALANCING COMMON
GOODS AND PERSONAL PRIVACY
Through its health information privacy regulations, DHHS
attempts to protect individual privacy while recognizing legiti-
mate needs for such data to process health claims and deliver
medical care, as well as provide for common goods. As we dis-
cuss above, the regulations adopt an "anti-disclosure" rule for
data that are not related to health care. Thus, uses and disclo-
sures of health data outside the health care setting are prohib-
ited without specific, written authorization.
The regulations, however, do permit disclosures for a vari-
ety of non-health care purposes without written authorization,
such as national defense and security, identification of de-
ceased persons, and the administration of justice. 137 One of the
134. Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(iv).
135. Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(v).
136. Id. § 164.508(b)(5).
137. A covered entity may disclose PHI in a judicial or administrative pro-
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most controversial exceptions to the "authorization" rule in-
volves parental access to a minor's medical records. Disclo-
sures to parents of unemancipated minors are exempted from
authorization requirements depending on state law. If state
law forbids or requires that parents be informed about their
children's health conditions, the regulations allow state law to
stand. 138 Absent any applicable state law, parents may serve
as personal representatives, 139 who act on behalf of the individ-
ual140 with some restrictions. 141
We apply our balancing approach to five additional broad
exceptions to the anti-disclosure rule: public health, health re-
search, law enforcement, familial notification, and commercial
marketing. In each context, the most important consideration
is whether the loss of privacy is justified by the achievement of
a substantial public purpose.
A. PUBLIC HEALTH
DHHS's privacy regulations broadly exempt 42 disclosures
of PHI for routine public health activities. 143 This includes dis-
closures (a) where federal or state law authorizes public health
authorities1 44 to collect PHI to prevent or control disease, in-
jury, or disability, or report child abuse or neglect; (b) to notify
persons who may be at risk for or exposed to a communicable
disease (e.g., partner notification provisions);145 and (c) concern-
ing adverse events, tracks, and product recalls, and post-
marketing surveillance by persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the Food and Drug Administration.146 In addition, state report-
ing or other public health laws are not preempted by the rule
ceeding in response to an order of the court or administrative tribunal or, in
certain circumstances, a subpoena or discovery request.
138. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2001) (defining a "more stringent" state law).
139. Id. § 164.502(g)(3).
140. Id. § 164.502(g)(2).
141. If the minor consents to the health care service, the parent agrees to
confidentiality between provider and the minor, or the minor consents and
does not wish the parent to be personal representative, then the parent is not
considered a personal representative. Id. § 164.502(g)(3).
142. Id. § 164.514(b)(2) (clarifying that all of the exceptions apply to uses of
PHI as well as disclosures in the public health exemptions section).
143. See Gostin, supra note 91, at 3019.
144. Public health authority is expansively defined as a federal, tribal,
state, or local agency, or a person or entity with a grant of authority or con-
tract with the agency. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001).
145. Id. § 164.512(b)(1)(i), (ii), (iv).
146. Id. § 164.512(b)(1)(iii).
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even if they offer fewer privacy protections.147 This preemptive
measure leaves intact (1) existing state law requirements for
the use or disclosure of identifiable health data by public health
authorities; and (2) public health information privacy regula-
tions under an inconsistent array of state laws. Even though
state and local public health authorities have an excellent re-
cord of maintaining the confidentiality of identifiable health
data, we (and others) have suggested the need for better pri-
vacy protections for state public health data.1 48
Despite the need for improved privacy protections for pub-
lic health data at the state level, DHHS's public health excep-
tion from individual consent and authorization requirements
reflects a proper balance of individual and collective interests.
The benefits of public health relate to society as well as indi-
viduals. Public health practice has traditionally relied on these
disclosures as authorized through federal, state, and local laws
and respected the sensitive nature of the information. Though
the autonomous interests of individual are infringed to some
extent, the utilitarian premise that individuals should contrib-
ute to these greater goods in society sustains these types of dis-
closures.
B. HEALTH RESEARCH
A covered entity can use or disclose PHI for health re-
search without individual authorization if it obtains a waiver
from an Institutional Review Board (IRB) or a privacy board.
To understand the significance of this provision, it will be help-
ful to explain current law regulating human subject research.
Most federally funded human subject research is subject to
federal regulations known as the Common Rule. 149 The Com-
mon Rule does not set forth detailed privacy standards.
Rather, it conditions IRB approval of government-sponsored re-
search on whether "there are adequate provisions to protect the
privacy of subjects.1150 Though the Common Rule is a helpful
guide for protecting the privacy and other ethical interests of
human research subjects, it does not apply to privately funded
147. Id. § 160.203(c) (2001).
148. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Informational Privacy and the Public -
Health: The Model State Public Health Privacy Act, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1388 passim (2001).
149. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46
(2001).
150. Id. § 46.111(a)(7).
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research.
DHHS's health information privacy regulations apply more
detailed privacy requirements than exist under the Common
Rule. In general, specific authorization for the use or disclo-
sure of health data for research is needed. A covered entity
may, however, use or disclose PHI for research without the per-
son's authorization if it obtains a waiver from an IRB or pri-
vacy board151 that finds (1) the use or disclosure involves no
more than minimal risk; (2) the waiver will not adversely affect
the privacy rights and welfare of the individuals; (3) the re-
search could not practicably be conducted without the waiver;
(4) the privacy risks are reasonable in relation to the antici-
pated benefits, if any, to individuals and the importance of the
research; (5) a plan exists to protect the identifiable informa-
tion from improper use and disclosure; (6) a plan to destroy the
identifiers exists unless there is a health or research justifica-
tion for retaining them; and (7) there are written assurances
that the data will not be reused or disclosed to others, except
for research that would also qualify for a waiver.152 Research-
ers must also show that PHI is necessary for the research, will
not be disclosed to outsiders, and is sought solely for research
purposes. 53
Critics are concerned about the burdens imposed by the
new requirements.1 54 The regulations limit the ways that re-
searchers can access, use, and disclose health data for research
purposes. Researchers are worried that new regulations will
slow or halt existing and future research efforts. 155 Yet, the
regulations support the need to utilize PHI without consent,
and provide a workable framework for protecting individual
151. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i). The privacy board must have members with
varying backgrounds, appropriate professional competency, and no conflict of
interest. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(B). At least one member must be unaffiliated
with the covered entity and research entity. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(B)(2). This
includes relatives of individuals affiliated with the organizations. Id. A ma-
jority of the privacy board must be present when considering a waiver, includ-
ing the unaffiliated member. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(B).
152. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii).
153. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii); see Mark Barnes & Sara Krauss, The Effect of
HIPAA on Human Subjects Research, 10 HEALTH L. REP. 1026, 1030-31
(2001).
154. Jocelyn Kaiser, Researchers Say Rules Are Too Restrictive, 294 SC0.
2070 (2001); Kulynych & Korn, supra note 33, at 201; see, e.g., Barnes &
Krauss, supra note 153, at 1031 (suggesting that IRBs are ill-prepared to
make the assessments now required of them by the health data privacy rule).
155. Kulynych & Korn, supra note 33, at 201.
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privacy while also facilitating research. Like the use or disclo-
sure of health data for public health, there are societal benefits
to facilitating high quality clinical or health services research.
Provided that the measures imposed by the regulations do not
significantly thwart health research, they fit well within our
balancing approach.
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT
A covered entity may disclose PHI to a law enforcement of-
ficial without authorization or informed consent pursuant to a
court order, subpoena, or administrative request, including a
civil investigative demand or an administrative subpoena. 156 In
addition, a covered entity may disclose limited information 57
without prior judicial approval where (1) the information re-
lates to a crime victim who is incapacitated and disclosure is
necessary and in the best interests of the victim; 158 (2) PHI is
evidence of criminal conduct that occurred on the premises of
the covered entity;159 or (3) in the course of an emergency, dis-
closure is necessary to alert law enforcement to the location,
commission, and nature of the crime, victims, or perpetra-
tors.
16 0
It is difficult to balance individual and collective interests
in sharing health data for law enforcement purposes. 161 Indi-
156. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1) (2001). When an administrative request is
utilized, the rule lays out certain requirements: "(1) [tlhe information sought is
relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry; (2) [tlhe re-
quest is specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable... ;
and (3) [dle-identified information could not reasonably be used." Id.
§ 164.512(f)(1)(C).
157. The permitted information is name, address, date and place of birth,
social security number, blood type, type of injury, date and time of treatment,
and a description of distinguishing characteristics. Id. § 164.512(f)(2)(i).
158. Id. § 164.512(f)(3). The specific criteria are (1) the law enforcement
official states that the information is needed to determine whether a crime oc-
curred by an individual other than the victim and that the information will
not be used against the victim; (2) the law enforcement official represents that
immediate law enforcement activities would be jeopardized by waiting for con-
sent; and (3) the covered entity determines that the disclosure is in the best
interest of the individual. Id. § 164.512(f)(3)(iii). If the patient is competent
and no emergency exists, the patient must agree under the exception for the
disclosure to occur. See id. § 164.512(f)(3).
159. Id. § 164.512(f)(5).
160. Id. § 164.512(f)(6).
161. Peter H.W. Van Der Goes, Jr., Comment, Opportunity Lost: Why and
How to Improve the HHS-Proposed Legislation Governing Law Enforcement
Access to Medical Records, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1009 (1999).
1474 [Vol.86:1439
20021 PERSONAL PRIVACYAND COMMON GOODS 1475
viduals rightfully may be concerned about the nonconsensual
sharing of their data with government officials who are empow-
ered to use these data in ways that may counter individual in-
terests. Law enforcement, however, may have a strong claim to
the data to protect the health or lives of the individual, other
persons, or the community as a whole. For example, law en-
forcement may need to gain access to an individual's health
profile to help identify a suspected bioterrorist. In these cases,
law enforcement officials may oppose the federal requirement
that they must first obtain a warrant, subpoena, or other court
order prior to accessing individual health data.162
Broad disclosures to law enforcement officials can weaken
the public's trust in how their health care data are used and
disclosed. DHHS's privacy regulations arguably make it too
easy for unauthorized disclosures to police to take place. Nota-
bly, limited disclosures may occur without a judge's approval
through administrative requests. Even if a court does make
the decision, the regulations do not provide clear criteria.
A better privacy rule would be to require a court order
prior to disclosure, except in cases of emergencies that endan-
ger public health and safety. Courts, moreover, need clear cri-
teria for making decisions to allow disclosure. Judges could or-
der disclosures, for example, if there were probable cause that
the evidence was necessary for the prosecution of a serious of-
fense or if it were necessary to prevent a serious future harm.
If there were an impartial judicial process based on restrictive
standards of disclosure, privacy would be protected without
unduly interfering with the legitimate pursuit of crime investi-
gation and prosecution.
D. FAMILIAL NOTIFICATION
Disclosures to family or "significant others" (i.e., friends,
caretakers, or health care surrogates) of adults and emanci-
pated minors are narrowly exempted. Covered entities may
disclose limited health information to family members or "sig-
nificant others" without consent if the patient is informed in
advance and has the opportunity to agree. 163 The disclosed PHI
162. Sharon J. Hussong, Medical Records and Your Privacy: Developing
Federal Legislation to Protect Patient Privacy Rights, 26 AI. J.L. & MED. 453,
458-59 (2000).
163. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(1), (2) (2001). Disclosure is also permitted if
the covered entity can reasonably infer from the circumstances that the pa-
tient does not object to disclosure. Id. § 164.510(b)(2)(iii).
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must be (1) "directly relevant to such person's involvement"
with the patient's care or payment for care;164 or (2) used to no-
tify that person of the patient's location, general health condi-
tion, or death.1 65 In cases of incapacitation or emergency, dis-
closures may be made in the patient's best interest when
directly relevant to the entities' involvement with the individ-
ual's care. 166
Despite health providers' concerns about interference with
standard practices of notifying next of kin or others of an indi-
vidual's admission, treatment, or prognosis, the regulations al-
low these practices to continue without extinguishing an indi-
vidual's right to control the recipients and circumstances of
these disclosures. An individual is entitled to expect a higher
degree of autonomy surrounding these disclosures, and the
regulations attempt to preserve some control without eliminat-
ing disclosures under specific circumstances.
E. COMMERCIAL MARKETING
In contrast to the other anti-disclosure exceptions, which
offer either greater or similar protections than national or state
laws currently provide, the exception for commercial marketing
provides for less privacy protection by condoning the use or dis-
closure of PHI for commercial marketing without consent167
PHI may be used or disclosed by covered entities without indi-
vidual authorization for marketing communications to the indi-
vidual that (1) occur in "face-to-face encounters" (whether
health-related or not 168), (2) "[cloncern[] products or services of
nominal value," or (3) "[c]oncern[] the health-related products
and services of the covered entity or of a third party."169 Com-
mercial communications must identify the covered entity, dis-
close whether the entity is receiving remuneration for the
communication or sale, and instruct individuals how they can
164. Id. § 164.510(b)(1)(i).
165. Id. § 164.510(b)(1)(ii).
166. Id. § 164.510(b)(3). The regulations allow relatives and close personal
friends to perform common care-taking duties such as picking up prescriptions
and medical supplies. Id.
167. ROBERT GELLMAN, ANALYSIS OF THE MARKETING PROVISIONS OF THE
HIPAA PRIVAOY RULES (Jan. 2001), available at http'//www.hipaadvisory.com/
action/privacy/marketing.htm.
168. Id.
169. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2) (2001).
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opt out of receiving future communications. 170 If a covered en-
tity targets persons based on their health status, it must pre-
determine whether the product or service may be beneficial to
the persons and indicate why the persons have been selected. 171
In the preamble to the regulations, DHHS explains that
the covered entity need not conduct the marketing itself. It can
hire out work, such as telemarketing or direct mailings, to a
business associate. Furthermore, the covered entity can mar-
ket products or services of a third party. Thus, the marketed
goods need not be exclusively those of the covered entity.172
The commercial marketing exception is challengeable on
many grounds: (1) It facilitates the ability of providers, insur-
ers, pharmacists, laboratories, or their business associates to
approach health consumers for a variety of commercial prod-
ucts or services; (2) it does not specify the basis for (or who gets
to decide) what products or services are "beneficial" to patients
or insureds; (3) it makes individuals unwitting participants in
commercial marketing efforts 173 by requiring individuals to opt
out of the communication or other marketing technique, in-
stead of allowing them to opt in;174 and (4) it does not require
covered entities to make it easy for health consumers to opt out
through toll-free numbers, postage-free mailings, or interactive
websites.
Perhaps most importantly, the commercial marketing ex-
ception infringes individual privacy interests by disclosing PHI
to others for non-health related purposes that most do not view
as societally beneficial. Like public health authorities and
health researchers, covered entities may claim a need for PHI
to market products, services, or knowledge that can improve
individual and communal health. However, where access to
PHI is motivated by profit-oriented goals (as contrasted with
170. Id. § 164.514(e)(3)(i).
171. Id. § 164.514(e)(3)(ii).
172. Standards for the Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Informa-
tion, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,461 (Dec. 28, 2000).
173. See Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 2001) (certi-
fying a group of individuals as a class for the purposes of challenging a phar-
macy practice of using their identifiable data for a drug information program
without consent).
174. DHHS has recently proposed that covered entities must obtain indi-
vidual informed consent prior to sending patients marketing materials. Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., HHS Proposes Changes that
Protect Privacy, Access to Care (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http'J/
www.hhs.gov/newstpress/2002pres/20020321a.html.
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the community-oriented goals of public health or academic or
non-profit research), the claim for non-consensual access to PHI
is unjustified under our balancing approach. People may
choose to participate in private sector marketing campaigns but
should not have to. The commercial marketing exception per-
mits potentially broad disclosures based on profit motives with-
out individuals having an advance opportunity to object.
CONCLUSION
In the computer age where individual health data are in-
creasingly acquired, used, disclosed, and stored in electronic
formats, threats to privacy concern American consumers. The
existing inadequacy of health information privacy protections
and the potential for discrimination, stigmatization, or embar-
rassment of individuals based on misuses or wrongful disclo-
sures of their sensitive health data justify new privacy protec-
tions. DHHS's health information privacy regulations provide
a federal floor of protections that empower individuals with af-
firmative new rights to access and control the uses and disclo-
sures of their health data.
Protecting individual privacy is an important objective un-
derlying a national privacy policy, but it is not the sole aim.
There are legitimate needs for sharing health data to accom-
plish public benefits. Achieving a balance between personal
privacy and public goods is difficult. There are few guides to
balancing in the extant scholarship. We suggest that to prop-
erly balance these interests, health information privacy policies
should abandon a focus on individual autonomy. A national
health information privacy standard should attempt to maxi-
mize individual privacy interests where the risks of harm are
greatest (e.g., concerning disclosures to employers, insurers, so-
cial contacts, and commercial entities), and maximize common
goods where the public interests are strongest (e.g., public
health and research). Striking this balance may diminish indi-
vidual autonomy in non-harmful ways, but also promises sig-
nificant communal benefits.
DHHS's attempt to balance individual and communal in-
terests in the sharing of health data through its health infor-
mation privacy regulations is consistent with this approach in
notable ways. For example, the requirement for written au-
thorization for many disclosures of health data outside the
health care context fulfills individual privacy interests where
they matter most. Exceptions to this general requirement for
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disclosures for public health and health research are warranted
to further important societal objectives. However, the regula-
tions also fail to adhere to our approach. Requiring individual
informed consent for disclosures of health data for health-care
related purposes is neither informed nor consensual, and does
little to protect individual privacy while significantly burdening
the health care system. As well, disclosure for law enforcement
purposes is currently too easy, without judicial supervision
based on clear standards. Finally, disclosure exceptions for
commercial marketing fail to promote an important public pur-
pose and can lead to breaches of privacy. Thus, while new
health information privacy regulations are a key step forward
in the pursuit of a cohesive national health data policy, addi-
tional progress on balancing the sharing of health data for
communal purposes and protecting individual privacy interests
is needed.
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